Archive for the Body and Affect Category

Laughter in Deleuze

Posted in Body and Affect, Deleuze, Foucault, Nietzsche with tags , , , , , , on May 17, 2012 by immanentterrain2

One of my favorite quotations from all of the media studies program—and I can’t put my finger on why, precisely, but I often find its final four words bouncing into my thoughts unannounced—comes from Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment: “The culture industry replaces pain, which is present in ecstasy no less than in asceticism, with jovial denial” (112). Reading Deleuze, I’ve encountered at least two other moments where laughter comes into play, and not the pathetic laughter of the denial of the dominated, but another form of unexpected laugher, bizarre good humor given the circumstances.

In the chapter of Deleuze’s book on Foucault about Discipline and Punish, that seminal and terrifying book on the surveilling Panopticon and the theater of punishment, Deleuze opens nearly sadistically: “The Divine Comedy of punishment means we can retain the basic right to collapse in fits of laughter in the face of a dazzling array of perverse inventions, cynical discourses and meticulous horrors. A whole chain of phenomena, from anti-masturbation machines for children to the mechanics of prison for adults, sets off an unexpected laughter which shame, suffering or death cannot silence” (23). Expressing laughter seems to suggest an interior that may be affected by outside events but that will not be fully subsumed by them. Even darker, though resilient, is how Deleuze calls this laughter “a great joy which is not the ambivalent joy of hatred, but the joy of wanting to destroy whatever mutilates life” (23).

Another example comes in “Nomadic Thought,” in which Deleuze attributes Nietzsche’s unlikely but essential laughter to the unbounded joy of revolution in the face of atrocity. Laughter is positive and creative, an uncontrollable escape from restraints of imposed logic and morality. Laughing at the traumatic, as Deleuze prescribes for readers of Foucault, at least flies in the face of a morality instated by transcendence. There is a war between those who seek to control and those who seek to liberate action and maximize potential for individuals to enter into productive and creative relations that have not been imposed upon them. And on the fighting side there is still a path to happiness, often found in subversiveness of minor literature. The philosophers championed by media studies tend not to fall into despair; no matter how dire their findings on control societies or bodily torture, something keeps them bouncing up. Whether we’re being denied autonomy, as in Adorno, or coming “face to face with something sickening, ignoble, disgusting,” as Deleuze describes the provocation for Nietzsche’s laughter in “Nomadic Thought” (258), there’s always something to laugh about. Isn’t that funny?

-Duncan Cooper

Deleuze, Gilles, and Seán Hand. Foucault. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988.

Deleuze, Gilles. “Nomadic Thought.” Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974. Ed. David Lapoujade. Trans. Michael Taormina. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2004.

Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Continuum Pub., 1972.
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Images of Sound

Posted in Art, Art and Philosophy, Art Exhibits, Body and Affect, Deleuze, Film, Theater and Performance with tags , , , , , on May 16, 2012 by immanentterrain2

Applying Deleuze theories on temporarily to sound and music is very interesting. First it is a reminder that image is not only the visual image but any fluctuation within the fabric of the environment that affects our (or any organism’s) perceptual sensors. More importantly the temporal characteristics of sound is different from the moving image. Sound necessarily unfolds through time and a still or snap shot of sound is not imaginable. Music has also been created for thousands of years with primitive tools and without a technological apparatus mediating between creator and the images. One of the first mediation affecting the temporarily of music, at least in terms of its production, was the invention of systems of musical notation. Recording technologies pushed this separation further but at the same time created a reaction to emphasize on the zone of indeterminacy in improvisational music.

Roulette was hosting an opening concert for the 3 day event on ‘Improvisation and Technology’ in conjunction with Department of Music at Colombia University and NYU. The interesting irony about that event was that unlike most of the times that technology, as mentioned above, is being used to decreases virtuality, in this events, it was used to intervene into the regular flow of music to make unexpected happen.

The setup of the stage, with more than 30 computers and different conventional and experimental instruments on the stage, was promising failure to some extent from what had been planned. In many pieces improvising machines were being used to create effects based on what the musician was playing and forcing the musician to change what she was playing, creating a loop of reactions to make the result of the piece completely out of control of the musician. In some other pieces looping machines were recording and looping parts of the performance based on some algorithms creating overlaying and juxtapositions of time.

In overall there were very interesting and state of the art experiments in pushing improvisational music into the extreme to allow the most unexpected to happen. This is also in relation to Deleuze’s idea of desert island that something bold and novel does not happen as a continuation of what had been but as an eruption.

Deleuze, Gilles. Desert islands and other texts, 1953-1974. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e) ;, 2004. pp. 9-14

Embodiment in New Media

Posted in Art and Philosophy, Bergson, Body and Affect, Deleuze, Phenomenology with tags , , , , , on May 15, 2012 by immanentterrain2

Hansen in New Philosophy for New Media [1] argues that New Media brings the possibility of overcoming the immobility and passiveness of observer as it was the case in theater, photography, cinema, etc. and enabling user to create meaning for digital data by unfolding it through embodied interaction. But a piece that is ignored is that the mediation happens through a software to create a reaction to users’ body. In a natural environment users action is propagated through environment creating a series of crystallization and events, creating a series of zones of in-determination that are unfolding through time. In case of a digital interface (embodied or a flat screen) the results are in most cases a series of causal deterministic events that are designed by the designer (artist) to respond to users’ interaction. If there is any degree of indeterminacy, it is either the result of hardware flaws (software by definition is deterministic) or a simulated pseudo-randomness designed and hard coded into the system by the designer. This is completely in contrast with what Bergson and Deleuze describe as the crystallization through time. When user input is entered into the digital system, it is in a realm that everything can be (and will be) re-created and happened absolutely the same.

So the process of phenomenological body and digital environment interaction does not give enough agency to the body (in comparison to the designer of software) to be credited as meaning giving embodied interaction. On the contrary, as Manovich explains [2], new media in many cases only make the interaction more explicit and objectified. If we consider interpretation as a form of interaction and negotiating context between observer and the object (art), new media art has made this process more conscious and explicit and more prone to banality.

On the other hand embodiment is not only the use of our bodily actuators in reaction to every stimulus from the environment. Especially in Art if we limit the notion of embodiment to such reactions, art through history has been mostly disembodied. I think embodiment in the broader sense is all the feeling and emotions that we experience as an embodied being but are not within the grasp of thought as concepts or words. Then art is a way of communicating these embodied feelings through images (not necessarily visual images). In that sense a movie or a classical painting or a monophonic sound piece may be more embodied than an interactive piece that user controls a camera with a joystick.

[1] Hansen, Mark B. N.. New philosophy for new media. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004.

[2] Manovich, Lev. The language of new media. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. pp 55-61

Adoration of the Magi (Leonardo da Vinci)

The Time-Image and Crystal-Image

Posted in Body and Affect, Deleuze, Film on May 12, 2012 by immanentterrain2

While Tarkovsky is a great example of the time-image, Bela Tarr is in some ways even more extreme in his long-take aesthetic choices.  As these 2 shots from Damnation (1988) illustrate, his ability to incorporate concrete time and movement into how his stories are told is masterful.  While Tarkovsky often paints his images with a romantic sense of color and movement, Bela Tarr’s images are Black and White, stark, artificial, and bleak, infused with an existential malaise that feels straight out of a Film Noir at times.  While Deleuze’s examples of Time-Images are almost counter intuitive to his arguments, many examples found in the films of Tarr and Tarkovsky illustrate supreme examples of the combination of concrete time and movement within a shot.  In arguing for a Cinema of Time-Images in which the images and movement unfold over concrete time, Tarkovsky illustrates an alternative sense of montage in which the link between frames can be made within the frame as well.  Bela Tarr’s supreme example of a Time-Image found within his masterpiece Damnation is, for me, a slightly better example than the one from class and infinitely better than the Ozu shot referenced in Deleuze’s book.  In fact, the example from class, taken from Tarkovsky’s Mirror (1975), feels to me more of an example of Crystal-Images due to Tarkovsky’s layering of his personal, virtual memories over actualities from the present such as his mother’s voice.  Tarkovsky made 2 films about the virtual and actual colliding (Mirror and Solaris) in the way that Deleuze describes the Crystal-Image as virtual being made explicit within the actual.  When Kelvin finds himself on Solaris at the end of the film, this is the epitome of the Crystal-Image as his memories have been made explicitly actual on another planet.  The whole film is about the virtual becoming actual, and the film is sometimes interpreted as about Schizophrenia, which it could very well be.  Mirror is the same way, but exists in a film world between Documentary and Fiction.

In Pervert’s Guide To The Cinema Slavoj Zizek deconstructs this scene through a Lacanian interpretation, essentially concluding that once Judy is transformed into the figure of Scotty’s lack, he satisfies his desire so that the second loss of Judy/Madeleine is a true loss.  While the interpretation, for me, was quite interesting and actually makes sense when I heard it a year ago, to think of the film in a Deleuzian sense opens it up to infinite possibilities.  Hitchcock’s films, and especially Vertigo (1958), are often interpreted in a Psychoanalytic light, and they also signify the link between the two semiotic systems of cinematic expression that Deleuze examines in his books on Cinema.  His films without a doubt hold a very important place in the history of Cinema.  While I would argue that Time-Images and Crystal-Images probably sprung up before the split Deleuze discusses in his books (Man Ray films are all about Actualizing the Virtual and deterretorializing the image), Hitchock’s supreme Crystal-Image in this clip from vertigo stands for me as one of the few good examples Deleuze gives of the virtual being made explicit in the actual.  Scotty’s virtual memories of Madeleine are made explicitly actual as the camera whirls around them when they kiss.  In this sense, Scotty is not trying to satisfy a lack or obtain the figure of the Other or any of that, his quest to reattain Madeleine is more about escaping the restrictions of time and memory, and essentially the very Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalytic system Hitchcock is often examined with.  It is strange that Vertigo is not associated with Schizophrenia as much as it is with Psychoanalysis.

It seems to me that, from Deleuze’s examples and his description of it, in order to achieve a crystal image, semiotic structures must be created over time within the film’s own system and manipulated so as to represent virtual or actual elements that are ultimately connected, layered, and made explicit within/over one another.  My question is can there be an immediately given Crystal-Image?  Does one need to establish a structure of significance in order to manipulate it into a Crystal Image or can one just be plucked out of or appropriated from the mileau?  Within a single autonomous Time/Movement-Image, can a Crystal-Image be created?  What does this image where virtual and actual collide imply for media that has become assimilated into cultural consciousness and has essentially become shared cultural memory, which would be rather high up Bergson’s cone of pure memory, such as the Zapruder Film or images of the atomic bomb blasts?  Are these immediately given Crystal-Images based on their combination of virtual memory and actual event?  Would that mean that Crystal-Images depend on our cultural sense of semiotic images, memory, and the virtual/actual?

Jeff

Tarkovsky, Andrei. Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987. Print.

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time Image. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1989. Print.

Relations, Folds, Affects, Forms

Posted in Art, Art Exhibits, Body and Affect, Deleuze, Immanence, Process Ontology, Rhizome on May 2, 2012 by immanentterrain2

During the semester I went to the MoMa specifically with the intention of exploring the contemporary galleries on the 2nd floor, and with the hope to eat curry in Rikrit Tiravanija’s Untitled (Free/Still), which unfortunately had closed down by the day I got there.  While I wasn’t able to explore that piece, I engaged with a few pieces that have remained with me for this or that reason since my exploration of the exhibit, and I want to use this as a forum to explore why these pieces struck me and why they have remained with me.

I enjoy going to museums, and the city has some of the best and worst examples of them.  The MoMa, especially on Free Friday, is a perfect example of museums gone commercially wrong.  There are thousands of people shuffling in lines through completely white rooms, absorbing a piece for maybe a few seconds and eventually moving on.  The gift shops on every floor are filled with books, mugs, key chains and more with the stamp of various artists or iconic paintings.  I wouldn’t be surprised to see a candy wrapper from Felix Gonzalez-Torres’ Untitled (Placebo) on a T-shirt. However, in the galleries, every once in a while, someone will remain on a piece for a time for this or that reason. I had a few of these experiences, but only one on the 2nd floor.

I understand the idea behind relational aesthetics, and for me, sublimating the medium to the ideas behind the piece is equally as appealing as it is horrifying, and the emphasis on relations between people is enthralling.  Regardless, there is still some medium in the relational exhibits we’ve been shown, be it wood and curry, candy, or dilapidated huts in ethnic neighborhoods, and my question is if art is about the ends rather than the means, so to speak, as these exhibits, to me, all seem less focused on the experience (relation between person and piece) and more so about the relation between people in regards to the ideas of the piece.  All the Deleuzian thought that we’ve covered so far would lead me to say it is not about conversing about the piece or the experience but the experience itself: the means leading one self to the ends.  I say this knowing my own bias, as the pieces I related with (2 specifically) were all based in a medium, as has almost every art piece I’ve ever engaged with.  The other question brought to my mind is if there is a way to sublimate or remove the medium of cinema in this sense.

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The piece that truly shook the very fiber of my being during my visit was Keith Haring’s masterpiece, Untitled (1982), which occupies nearly 3 walls of a room on the 2nd floor that for some silly reason has a trio of basketballs in the middle, right where the perfect view of the piece is.  Regardless, in my attempt to describe my experience in words, there is no way I can communicate the sublime shock that overcame me when I rounded the corner and saw the room and the piece.  I’ve only seen a few Haring pieces in real life, and still have yet to make it to the exhibit in Brooklyn, but this specific piece is simply incredible. When viewed from right to left, it depicts basically every Haring theme and image in some sort of epic, grand narrative of humankind, and yet every corner of it contains folds within folds so that one can remain within a certain section of the piece for lengthy periods of time.  I spent what felt like an hour going back and forth through this piece, discovering new image after image every time I returned to a section.  I didn’t even see the giant penis the men having sex with each other were riding on, or the Mickey Mouse testicles, until the 2nd or 3rd time around.  The piece is, to say the least, baroque in the sense Deleuze describes in his essay, “The Fold.”

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The other piece that grabbed my attention from another side of the room was Kandinsky’s Panels for Edwin R. Campbell.  Even now looking at these pieces on a computer monitor, they seem to jump out of the screen.  The description reads, “Kandinsky coined the expression ‘nonobjective painting’ to refer to painting that depicted no recognizable objects. Although preliminary studies for one of these paintings suggest that Kandinsky had a landscape in mind when he conceived it, he ultimately envisioned these works as free of descriptive devices. Kandinsky stressed the impact of color and its association with music, explaining that, “color is a means of exerting direct influence upon the soul.”  Whatever Kandinsky was painting, he painted the affects of the pieces in a different way than Cezanne or Bacon, without any descriptors, using the simplest phonemes of formal composition: color and movement.  There is form, but not in the sense that we are used to, and it is painted so masterfully that it exerts a direct visceral response from the beholder upon viewing even on a computer monitor.  What the painting is describing is indescribable in words, as well as in any other medium and digital representation of the painting on a computer, but the affect comes across from piece to viewer without any problem.

Jeff

I Don’t Want to be a Spaghetti

Posted in Bergson, Body and Affect, Deleuze, Film, Immanence with tags , , , , , on April 17, 2012 by immanentterrain2

Lately, I have been obsessed with the concept of suspension of disbelief. To fully enjoy a movie, we must suspend our disbelief to a certain extent. If we sit there thinking, “this is only a movie,” we will not become immersed and the experience will not be as meaningful. To me, watching a good film is very much like being in a dream. In my dreams, sometimes bizarre events occur (and sometimes I even find them bizarre as I’m dreaming) but I never stop to analyze them – I just continue on with my actions. Also, transmogrification is a big part of dreaming. Throughout a dream, I might be in several radically different locations without any explanation as to how I got there. In dreams (and to a certain extent in films), time can be nonlinear and rapid changes need no explanation.

While watching the second half of Tropical Malady in class, it wasn’t until after the film had ended that I wondered, “what exactly did I just watch?” As the action was occurring on the screen, I was watching intently, curious to see what would happen next. Weerasethakul ended part one of his film without any resolution. Tong finishes licking Keng’s (potentially) urined-stained fingers and then walks away. When the second part of the film starts, it becomes clear that we are following a different narrative. While the same actors pop up, it is unclear to the viewer whether or not they are the same characters in part one. The fact that films like this exist (and are able to win the Jury Prize at Cannes) excites me. If viewers are becoming advanced enough to watch and enjoy films like Tropical Malady, the art of filmmaking will surely advance to new and exciting territories.

So, how does all of this apply to Gilles Deleuze? From what I understand thus far, Deleuze holds cinema in very high regard. Unlike other art (painting, sculpture, dance, etc.) it is not merely a means for communicating a message or an aesthetic device. Instead, cinema is pure immanence and sensation; cinema is its own reality. It’s also important to note that as a film is being made, it’s already a memory. While a painter can see what is he is working on as he works, a filmmaker cannot. Sure, he can edit and re-watch material thousands of times; however, memory plays a big role in the filmmaking process (after all, cinema is movement in time, so it’s not something that can be immediately absorbed all at once). At this point, Deleuze’s writings on memory and sensation are what most interest me most and have helped me to understand why he’s an important philosopher. Deleuze’s body of work seems to build toward a radically different film theory.

If we go back to Uexküll and the tick, we remember that the only way that tick knows of its existence is when it comes into contact with a warm blooded animal or the sun; the tick’s entire life revolves around these two sensations. For humans, life is different because there are larger external forces, more things to influence and to be influenced by. Sitting in a dark movie theater, watching a movie like Tropical Malady, my life becomes more like that of the tick because I am entering into a whole new existence, a new reality, a place that is “between art and life” (according to Godard) and seems more like a dream than being awake. When other elements are combined with the moving image, I think it becomes harder to become absorbed and experience a film the way a tick would sunlight. When I am just faced with the moving image and nothing more, I am given the opportunity to notice new things and to let my mind run wild. In movies without dialogue, I often find myself thinking incredibly random thoughts that don’t directly have anything to do with the film. Because I don’t have any dialogue to follow, I’m letting my eyes absorb the images and my mind run wild. When I watch films multiple times, I never experience them in the same exact way – it all depends on my mood, what I had been thinking about previous to the film screening, etc. Although the same images are repeating themselves, every single viewing is unique.

Since watching a movie is like dreaming, when we see a dream in a movie it is like having a dream within a dream. For example, the final scene of Ingmar Bergman’s Shame feels like a dream although it is not blatantly identified as such. Although I can’t find a clip of the final scene, here is the trailer for those who haven’t seen it:

To make a long analysis short, Bergman does many things in this final scene in order to make it feel dreamlike to the audience. In the beginning of the film, a character name Fillip is introduced as an acquaintance of the two main characters, Jan and Eva. When we see him again, he seems to have no memory of the couple – he doesn’t show any sort of recognition or compassion towards them when he sees them during war. Another character, Mrs. Jacobi, also goes unrecognized at the end of the film. In real life, people remember one another and even if they’re pretending not to, we can see glimmers of recognition in their eyes or on their faces. When watching the film, I Jan, Eva, and Fillip to remember one another; however, when they did not, I accepted it and did not question it until after the fact. In real life, I would find this lack of recognition strange and unacceptable; in cinema life (or cinema reality) I don’t really question anything until the film is over and the lights are turned on.

Recently, there have been many films about dreams. In Michel Gondry’s The Science of Sleep, Stephane’s father has just died and he’s moved back to France to live in his childhood apartment. While his mother has promised him a creative job, he realizes from the first day that he is just a cog in the wheel, copying and pasting text that he himself has not created. As the film progresses, the images on the screen become less easy to identify. Is this a dream? Is this really happening? As film progresses, I accept the images as the reality of the cinema – what is happening on the screen is, in some way, actually happening to Stephane. After the film is over and I actually try to decide what were Stephane’s dream and what was his reality, I realize that it is impossible to do. Gondry has created a film that is an combination of dream and reality – it’s a dream reality that we see on a screen (if that makes sense). Without artificial constructions, our minds are haphazard… filled with unconnected, delirious thoughts. In Gondry’s film, there are no artificial constructions and we are able to experience a mind unbound. The following is one of my favorite scenes from the movie:

Movies like The Science of Sleep are important because they provide a starting point for discussing philosophical ideas. As long as filmmakers keep creating works like Tropical Malady, people will continue to respond in new ways…there will be more opportunities for them to affect and be affected.

— Kilgore Trout

Spambots’ Becoming

Posted in Art, Body and Affect with tags , , , , , on April 14, 2012 by immanentterrain2

Out of respect for James Bridle (links: booktwo + The New Aesthetic), whose recent Lift Conference lecture, “We Found Love in a Coded Space,” lays substantial groundwork for this post linking Twitter bots to Deleuze’s concept of the virtual, I’ll open by transcribing his talk’s conclusion so you’ll know whose ideas come from where. [For the purposes of this course, I’m considering watching Bridle’s lecture online and gathering Twitter bot precedents my “field work”]. If you’re unfamiliar with Twitter bots, @Horse_ebooks is an ideal example, a Twitter account with a cult following that obliquely promotes an ebook-store of the same name by automatically tweeting random pieces of text apparently scraped from ebooks and websites. Scan through @Horse_ebooks for a minute, then jump into Bridle’s concluding remarks:

We share the world with these things… They’re co-created between our imaginations and the network. We increasingly inhabit this incredibly coded world—we’ve outsourced so much of our histories and emotions to the network that our stories are already extant in the world like Borge’s Library of Babel. We just need to put them in the right configuration for these stories to come out. Stories that are co-created by these vast, overlapping, virtual sensoriums that we can access through the network, many of which are artificial but no less real for it. They’re all out there, these consciousnesses, these ways of seeing the world, and what we need to be doing is to be sympathetic to them, to ask them into our lives, to try and collaborate with them rather than shut them down. Because they’re all looking for love. They want to speak to us. They want to be a part of the world, and all I ask is you look at them with happier eyes and invite them into the world and speak to them.

I contend, in an attempt to route Bridle’s ideas through Deleuze’s, that Twitter bots act call our attention to the virtual, ceaselessly sending probes on automatically generated lines of flight in attempts to activate emotion; and in their tireless pursuit of new connections, I think there is something inspiring about these spambots. Therefore, like Bridle, I believe both their approach and their specific probes should be embraced in order to generate new possibilities for our own thinking.

A report issued last month by the e-security firm Incapsula claimed 51% of internet traffic was non-human, with the greatest piece of that non-human slice taken by “search engine and other bot traffic.” Though we may be inclined to assume that we, human internet users, are the (intended) audience of things published on the internet, the likelihood that a large portion—the largest even!—of Twitter bots’ readers are other bots engaging them by sending their own probes suggests a rich, immeasurable and ever-changing bundle of hypertext possibilities far more complex than could be imagined by any single entity’s programmer. This raises an important consideration of the virtual dimension of Twitter bots: as they link with other bots in unforeseeable ways, together automatically generating new pathways through the internet and new connections waiting to be actualized by consumers, the groundwork for those connections occurs in a virtual space.

The bot’s have a potential for connection with other Twitter users that cannot be simply traced to their own programming; it is outside of them, in this undefinable network of bots communicating with each other, and it is inside of them, still indelibly linked to their programmed pursuit of certain keywords. Bots do have their own subjectivities and certain capacities to be affected, making them open or closed in rigidly bounded ways; for example, one could imagine a bot seeking out instances of “Zappos.com coupon” and nothing else. But another bot comes along with a propensity for Zappos and also targeting people with blonde hair (to sell hair dye or something), and then another bot interested in hair dye but also fans of the TV show The New Girl… and so and so on, working routes through a huge percentage of internet traffic, if Incapsula is to be believed, so that our first bot’s interest in Zappos.com coupons does not, in fact, account for everything it’s capable of affecting and being affected by. There is a field of spambot potential, part actual and part virtual.

As such, bots may be useful to stimulate creative thought in humans, actualizing unexpected potentials among people open to being affected. As an unlikely example, @Horse_ebooks tweeting “Who Else Wants To Drive around using WATER as FUEL and LAUGH” might not lead me to buy an e-book, as the bot ostensibly would like, but might spur me instead to invent new possibilities for an experimental flume ride. I don’t have to engage specific content to be affected, though, which is fortunate because often bot postings lean toward incomprehensible gibberish. Instead—and this is the most useful part for me, at least—I can be inspired by the bot’s tireless drive into the unknown, the way it sends probes wherever it can without ever becoming discouraged, without being sure where they’ll land, and knowing that doing so might very well create something qualitatively new.

-Duncan Cooper

Bridle, James. “We Found Love in a Coded Space.” Lecture. Lift12. Geneva. 7 Apr. 2012. Lift Conference. 6 Apr. 2012. Web. 7 Apr. 2012. http://liftconference.com/.