Archive for the Philosophy and Science Category

The Ergosphere as a facade: How the points of singularity in black holes and the worm holes they create connect to Deleuze’s concept of “The Fold”

Posted in Bergson, Deleuze, Philosophy and Science, Process Ontology with tags , on May 9, 2012 by immanentterrain2

(source: Into The Universe With Stephen Hawking)

Through the work of Gilles Deleuze, the connection found in the study of quantum and gravitational physics and black hole theory has never seemed more real. We have come to a point in our scientific endeavors where paradox itself, as a scientific and philosophical question, can be a valid solution to how human cognition (memory itself) works. Stephen Hawkings in his A Brief History of Time has gone into much detail with regards to this phenomena especially with concerns to his works with black holes. In effect, bringing these concepts down from the ether and calcifying them into a actual entity that can be somewhat conceived by the human intellect. A miracle of mathematics.  Hawkings has come to mathematically and theoretically articulate how travel in time is physically possible. This discourse alone opens up a myriad of ontological, epistemological, and philosophical questions. Why would we as human beings want to travel back and forth through time? The idea of paradoxes, of physically and consciously occupying two moments in time at the same instance, brings the question of the ethical and annihilatory capacity of this practice. What does it even mean to occupy to states in time essentially at the same time?

Worm holes make time travel possible. The connection of two points of singularity. Points of singularity are the points at which (in a black hole) gravity continuously collapses in on itself. A perpetual fold occurring past the event horizon, or the point at which time and space are affected by the movement of the black hole and can no longer escape.

The ergosphere around the event horizon is where everything gains a chromaticism. The portion of space and time where everything is in constant movement and variation. Deleuze’s philosophy is as much one of encounter as it is of proposing a process ontology. A philosophy of becoming. This process of slowing down the rotational spin caused by the gravity inherent with black holes is called frame dragging. Frame dragging, as conceived by theories of general relativity, is resultant of any rotating mass and its gravitational effects on the space-time directly outside of it. Whatever enters this ergosphere has the ability to enter and escape normally up to a certain extent. The interaction between black holes and the worm holes they create on both sides is made possible within this area of indetermination. An area that can be affected by but still retain some of its autonomy giving room for the process of the inward fold and the unfolding out into its milieu to take shape. What Deleuze would call, in his work with Leibniz and his concepts of monads with regards to identity, the façade.

The energy emitted from this point, its unfolding, is the façade from which we perceive it as fundamentally different from others. A mask – open, sensitive, and receptive – that allows for it to interact with the space and time that encompasses it. Allowing it to enter-into-activity with other singularities while holding its quasi-autonomy. Allowing it to always be in a state of becoming, constantly changing, affecting others as much as it is affected. Deleuze would use the idea of the Leibnizian Monad, an interior which acts much like the nuclear reaction or collapsing of gravity that occurs within a point of singularity or black hole, to relate how something that has this substantial interiority can interact with an exterior environment. “The mondad is the autonomy of the interior, an interior without exterior. Yet it has a correlative the independence of the façade, an exterior with an interior. It – the façade – can have doors and windows, it is full of holes, although there is no such thing as an empty space, a hole being nothing more than the site of a more subtle matter”[1]. Interactivity in and of itself gains a new meaning. As black holes and points of singularity, as being just that singular, all have a difference that is calculated by their relationship to their milieu.

The continuous folding and unfolding of these entities is of particular interest when it comes to travel in time. A mode of being that is indicative by its becoming as process. If points of singularity make up the terrain of all matter within the universe, proposed by Stephen Hawkings, and memory itself is the persistance of past image into the present, as proposed by Henri Bergson, then the fold as thought in and of itself gains a true materiality. As space,time, and light travels between points of singularity, the encounter of an interior with its exterior in space and time might just be the time travel that is spoken of by Bergson in his Matter and Memory. 

– Victor Peterson

[1] Deleuze, Gilles. “The Fold”. ” in Yale French Studies, trans. Jonathan Strauss, no. 80 (1991): p. 233

Hawking, S. W. A brief history of time. Bantam, 1998.


Of Actor-Networks and Virtual Assemblages

Posted in Bergson, Deleuze, Philosophy and Science, Process Ontology with tags , , , on April 17, 2012 by immanentterrain2

In Reassembling the Social Bruno Latour, a sociologist of science, explains Actor-Network Theory which seeks to understand constitutive relationships between actors, both animate and inanimate, and the generative potential of those interactions. He writes “…network does not designate a thing out there that would have roughly the shape of interconnected points, much like a telephone, a freeway, or a sewage ‘network’… It qualifies its objectivity, that is, the ability of each actor to make other actors engage in unexpected relations.” (Latour, 129)

Latour’s social science includes some appropriations of Deleuzian thought.In his introduction to Reassembling the Social, he proposes to reinvent or redefine sociology not as the ‘science of the social’ but as the ‘tracing of associations’. The social in Latour’s estimation does not imply a thing among things, “like a black sheep among white sheep, but a type of connection between things that are generally understood as social”. (Latour, 5) The study of the social does not emphasize actors simply co-existing with other actors as much as processes of interactions. Deleuzian notions of the intensive, the virtual and even the ‘will to power’ covered in Deleuze’s monographs on Hume, Leibniz and Nietzsche, as well as A Thousand Plateaus, along with other readings for class encouraged me to attempt to understand Actor-Network Theory in terms of Deleuzian thought and/or vice versa. During the course of the semester, I have been trying to slowly tease out three related questions concerning these thinkers: 1) in what ways are the theories put forth by these two philosophers similar; 2) what exactly sets them apart? 3) What is the significance of this relationship?

As Latour discusses the nature of facts in a larger project of build upon thought common to the social sciences and discover new controversies as to what the universe is comprised of, he proposes a four-part process that should allow the unveiling of the construction of what he calls “scientific facts”– the last item of which is of interest in this discussion: it is now possible to determine the processes allowing for plural realities as well as those leading to stability, whereas before scientific facts were understood in a linear, hierarchical way. Virtual assemblages in Latour’s thinking are comprised of objects, ideas and beings aggregated relationships in a body of potential. (Latour, 119)

Here Latour understands the virtual and the idea of the assemblage in the same way Deleuze would, and though not lacking in ontological importance, Latour’s assemblage is more concerned with tracking and noting permutations of ontic qualities within an an assemblage than Deleuze. Latour goes on to say: “An entity gains in reality if it is associated with many others that are viewed as collaborating with it. It loses reality if, on the contrary, it has to shed associates or collaborators—animate and/or inanimate.” (Latour, 257) In my mind this fits with Deleuze’s idea of  a diverse assemblage of animate and inanimate relationships of a body’s existence. I understand this as the double articulation that Deleuze would claim is inherent to the reality of entities.

In A Thousand Plateaus—“10,000 B.C.: The Geology of Morals”, the authors describe the first articulation as a process that combines substances into forms—a type of self production or regulation of becomings imposed on substances. This articulation is “the plane of content“. The second articulation provides overcoding, unification and heirarchization” in the “plane of expression” which refers to the agency, potential and attributes that the new aggregated object expresses.

Central to Latour’s theory is the notion that the part and whole are always one in the same body, instead of existing and functioning as separate bodies, as classical sociology dictates. This theory echoes Bergson’s idea of the part’s relationship to the whole. “It is…the performance of the movements which follow in the movements which precede, a performance whereby the part virtually contains the whole, as when each note of a tune learned by heart seems to lean over the next to watch its execution.” (Bergson, 94) This understanding of the part and the whole central Latour’s work is prefigured by the sociological theories of  Gabriel Tarde, who Deleuze and Guattari refer to in the “Micropolitics and Segmentarity” of A Thousand Plateaus—

 [while] Durkheim’s preferred objects of study were the great collective representations, which are generally binary, resonant, and overcoded. Tarde countered that collective representations presuppose exactly what needs explaining, namely “the similarity of millions of people. That is why Tarde was interested in the world of detail, or of the infinitesimal: the little imitations, oppositions, and inventions constituting an entire realm of subrepresentative matter… at a deeper level, it has to do not with an individual but with a flow or a wave. What, according to Tarde, is a flow? It is belief or desire (the two aspects of every [social] assemblage); a flow is always of belief and desire. Beliefs and desires are the basis of every society, because they are flows and as such are ‘quantifiable’; they are veritable Social Quantities, whereas sensations are qualitative and representations are simple resultants. (Deleuze and Guattari, 218-219)

Latour’s ideas of actor networks do not only appear similar to particular notions of process, virtual and actual in the work of Deleuze, Bergson and Tarde, but also of Gilbert Simondon and his notion of working beyond ideas of the real and the possible. In addition, Simondon’s introduction to  of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Object proposes a study to promote awareness of the importance of technology and technological objects as mediators between man and nature, which is similar to Latour’s focus in Actor-Network Theory. Simondon further declares  in the essay that culture incorrectly ignores technics as an essential component of human understanding and reality by donning a “mask of facile humanism to bind us to a reality full of human striving and rich in natural forces.” (Simondon, 1)

However, Latour emphasizes that these unexpected relationships between bodies or “actors” are useful for the development of a social science that could be derived between the interaction of actors. He wants these processes to be understood in some way, at least to persist in describing what is happening in any given instant. His goal is to actualize the virtual while not denying the existence of this potential. “It is a if [he] is saying to actors: ‘We won’t try to discipline you, to make you fit into our categories; we will let you deploy your own worlds, and only later will we ask you to explain how you came about settling them’.” (Latour, 23) He asks qualitative questions to actualize the virtuality of an actor’s experience. While respecting the ontological potential, Latour’s intent is clearly epistemological, or to quantify qualitative relations.

This is where I understand the philosophy of these two thinkers to depart and where the significance lies.  Deleuze’s philosophy is unquestionably ontological. In his mind, everything is a process—much like in Latour’s theory, but he is not interested in documenting this process or understanding the specific levels of flows of potential within a body. He is interested in the idea that these potentials exist unseen, indiscernible, containing and contributing to endless possibility. Though he realizes the actual must exist at points, his interest is in the process of change—not in what can be described but in what remains indescribable.

B. Paris


Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Zone. 1990.

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press. 1987

Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford University Press. 2007.

Simondon, Gilbert. “Genesis of the Individual”. in Interpretations. ed. Crary and Kwinter. 1992.

Simondon, Gilbert. On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. trans. Ninian Mellaphy. 1980.

Final Thoughts on “A Thousand Plateaus”

Posted in Art, Art and Philosophy, Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy and Science with tags on May 18, 2011 by immanentterrain2

Out of all the readings – many of which were quite challenging – A Thousand Plateaus was by far the most difficult for me to read and comprehend. It’s not that I don’t understand the concepts of Rhizome, Bodies WIthout Organs, Striated/Smooth Space, et al, but rather the difficulty I encountered lay in the style of writing. When first reading the book, I was taken back by the almost poetic stream of consciousness that showers from each paragraph, and it was only when I realized that this was indeed the point of much of the writing that I began to engage in a fruitful relationship with the text.

The text made me recall Nietzsche’s style of writing, which in itself confronts the supposedly sedentary status of language while at the same time putting forth new concepts. Indeed it would seem highly reductive to speak of Nietzsche’s concepts without addressing the means by which he explicates and expands on these concepts. In the work of Deleuze and Guattari, making this productive link between form and content made all the difference for me in understanding the works. It would be wrong to say that there aren’t serious concepts being explored in this tome, but in order for me to grasp them it was necessary to adopt a kind of intuition and reflection after the fact – much like Bazin insists on the meaning being produced a posterioriin neorealist cinema.

Though I couldn’t make the event at the Whitney, I was pleased to watch the video of the event. Apart from the fascinating nature of the combined and shared trades, I couldn’t help but feel that the reading of A Thousand Plateaus was entirely appropriate-achieving the poetic stream of consciousness I mentioned above. Though certainly useful to study in an academic context, I believe the value of the text is in its freedom of expression and form. Though sometimes I feel like it gets bogged down in digression and red herrings, there is a totally unique quality to the book because of this. It raises interesting questions concerning the written word and language in relation to philosophy. This of course seems entirely consistant with Deleuze’s project of linking art with philosophy and creating productive conduits between each field.

Forgive the brevity of my final post.
I have some Rhizomes to attend to.


1914: One or Several Wolves?

Posted in Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy and Science, Rhizome with tags , , , , on May 10, 2011 by immanentterrain2

You don’t have to read very far in Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter “1914: One or Several Wolves?” in A Thousand Plateaus to sense their near universal abhorrence for Freud’s reductionist methods of psychoanalysis. I have yet to come across anything as antithetical to Freud (granted I haven’t read that much on Freud) as the material found in this chapter, and it’s quite fascinating. Deleuze and Guattari don’t really bother deconstructing Freud’s arguments inasmuch as they more or less completely disregard them. Always “on the verge of discovering a rhizome” (27) but never allowing himself to cross that threshold, Deleuze and Guattari modify the fundamentals of Freudian psychoanalysis in a way that allows for psychoanalysis to build upon their model of the rhizome, assemblage, de-territorialization and re-territorialization.

They begin by delineating Freud’s definition of neurosis and psychosis. Freud claims that neurotics are those who are “capable of making a global comparison between a sock and a vagina, a scar and Castration” (27), but that they are incapable of perceiving larger connections and assemblages within the world. Meanwhile, the psychotic sees the pores, threads, minute connections in large surfaces and this direction of perception will effectively “‘prevent [the psychotic] from using them as substitutes for the female genital’” (Freud qtd. Deleuze and Guattari 27). From here, they claim Freud implies that the psychotic’s perception is defective. Their inability to reconcile their perception with their unconscious is, in the Freudian sense, abnormal. Deleuze and Guattari subvert Freud’s theories suggesting that the ability to distinguish multiplicities in a larger whole is not madness at all, but a process of becoming on the part of individual. It becomes no longer a question of comparison for the neurotic, as it is no longer a question of deficiency for the psychotic. It is Freud’s own shortcomings in limiting the ways in which the unconscious is affected by its interior and exterior milieu that contributes to his inability to evolve beyond the singular (Mother, Father, Castration, etc.).

They propose that the preconscious and unconscious be examined as a body without organs; a vessel or plane in which the process of becoming, de-territorialization and re-territorialization can occur. That which serves as organs is distributed among many. The singularity of one’s body becomes a plane in which a multiplicity of objects, beings, molecules and intensities become an extension of the unconscious and where affective internal and external forces can manifest. Every doubling or multiple that appear in dreams should not be divisible back to the singular as Freud would characteristically move to do, but should be examined as merely a fragment of a multiplicity of forces. Deleuze and Guattari clarify that “the body without organs is opposed less to organs as such than to the organization of the organs insofar as it composes an organism” (30).  Here, the natural formation, placement and presence of organs is subtracted from the body, and instead exists as a plane populated by multiplicities. From this point Deleuze and Guattari transition into their concept of the rhizome and its relation to the multiplicities they contend are present in dream space. They suggest, “one of the essential characteristics of the dream of multiplicity is that each element ceaselessly varies and alters its distance in relation to the others” (30). Multiplicities, populations and intensities circulate freely in dream space without limitations or conventions. The unrestrictive ebb and flow of mass in the unconscious materializes as intensity—something which cannot be measured as lack (something Freud might instinctively suggest), just infinite moves towards and away from the body without organs (31).

They conclude that Freud’s problem was as inevitable as it was inherent in his framework; it grew out of the limitations of linguistics, semiotics and dialectic. He perceived psychoanalysis as a means to give a voice to the unconscious, but failed to realize it would never speak (36). Multiplicities were born out of the very restrictions of dialectic—“to escape… to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical fragment of a lost Unity or Totality” (32). They come to encompass both preconscious and unconscious forces:

[f]or it is the assemblage of both these that is the province of the unconscious, the way in which the former condition the latter, and the latter prepare the way for the former, or elude them or return to them: the libido suffuses everything (35).

Deleuze And Guattari propose an alternative spectrum in which to examine perception and affect. One that accepts a free-play of relations without restrictions and without rigid links as to how their manifestation in the preconscious and unconscious be analyzed.

– Aïcha

Cave of Forgotten Dreams

Posted in Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari, Film, Philosophy and Science with tags on May 3, 2011 by immanentterrain2

Werner Herzog’s Cave of Forgotten Dreams – currently playing at the IFC Center – does not illustrate but, perhaps nods at a few Deleuzean ideas that I thought I could share with the class.

The film describes a culture of people who saw their world and the animal worlds as being, at times, overlapping. The cave paintings and sculptures created by the occupants of the area suggest many possible iterations of becoming-animal. The entire idea of ‘humanness’ is rejected. Instead, the concept of identity is both ‘fluid’ and ‘permeable’ (these are two terms used specifically by the filmmaker). In sculpture, the role or identity of ‘lion’ is shifted to suggest that of ‘man’. Similarly, in a cave painting (the only one to depict a human being), a woman is shown engaging in the act of lovemaking with what appears to be a bull or minotaur. And, although this could be said to be interpolation or conjecture by the site’s scientists, the people are described to us as being closer to an animalistic relationship with a territory by shifting with it and adapting to changes in it.

Also, in understanding a physical site occupied by human beings over 30,000 years ago, the film is a sort of negotiation between the smooth and the striated. As there is little solidity in the information about the Caluvet caves, the scientists, the filmmakers, and the viewer are all caught in a back and forth between applying contemporary ideas and structures to spaces that have a a foreign and at times unsettling appearance. For example, seemingly unfathomable, wavy shapes of crystal structures are almost instinctively described as having a ‘cloth-like’ appearance. The shape and form that we cannot identify is projected with the likeness of one that we can not only identify, but that we are comfortable with (this also can be compared to Deleuze’s ideas of the refrain and re-territorializing the foreign space).

Those are my comments on the ideas of the film and how they might be understood by Deleuze.

The 3D element of the film is just that – an element of the film. I can’t say that it enhances or detracts from the piece beyond the oooooh aaaahh nature of seeing inaccessible spaces simulated to appear as being in three dimensions – at times it was distracting and at other times it created some weirdly interesting, unstable visual effects. But I will say that even if you have trepidations about the simulation of three-dimensional space (especially in a documentary) the film could be worthwhile. It does, at times, seem to possibly reinforce a few of the main points we have been discussing in class.

-Matt Whitman

Perception, Creation, and Change…

Posted in Art and Philosophy, Deleuze, Philosophy and Science with tags on April 17, 2011 by immanentterrain2

A couple of months ago I was listening to a radio program where a genealogist (?) was discussing consciousness and evolution. To paraphrase what was said, “the first organisms to exist, existed in a one-dimensional world, that was their experience. However, sometime down the road, more advanced multi-cellular organisms developed, and their reality (perception) was two-dimensional. Then … slowly three-dimensional perceiving beings, us, humans came to be.” The essence of this discussion was that assuming that three-dimensional human perception is the pinnacle of evolution is mis-informed. Historically speaking, if there has been a slow evolution and expansion of perception, then that evolution will continue. Organisms, animals, humans, thus, all share the same common denominator that their perception is always limited. Limited to what they can sense, touch, interpret in their dimension. To perceive in this sense is to have a point of access.

Perception as a concept is something that I have been in an attempted process of deconstructing. It is a term that catches me every time I see it. This is, in part, because it is at the heart of my own interests (both conscious and otherwise) in theory, practice, relations, understandings. However, as a term in and of itself (just as with most language) its complexities seem particularly veiled. Pursuing its meaning for myself has led me to see it as a good example of where Nietzsche ‘s distrust in language may lay. Nietzsche viewed language as a producer of truth. Words get in the way, so to speak. Like a box full of many different objects, but the box is closed, and so we can simply call it a box. Content here is irrelevant to quality or quantity. Or the idea shrouds itself in a veil of complexity, but as a disguise.  For Nietzsche, all of the choices that we make are an accumulation of who we are. They are choices that we have learned through our access to the world. By extension, our perception becomes an accumulation of those same “choices” or what Hume calls habits. These habits repeated enough times become facts or laws, and systems of control are built up around them. The world, then, that we come to know is a complex construction, built up from the habits of those who sought and seek control, and our perception of it mediated. Further examples of this can be found in Foucault on control societies or Guy Debord’s “Society of the Spectacle.”

Perception has everything to do with who, what, where the individual is, because the interpretation of perception to action or thought are habits and reflexes learned over time. Breaking away from this mode of being must be an active intention, because it is a conscious movement away from traditional societal practices. This conscious movement is what Deleuze sees as true thought and creation. Of which tend to occur through art making, philosophizing, or other modes of creation. Deleuze sees pockets of possibilities for new relations here, when relations arise from areas where true thought or creativity has taken place.

However, something I find interesting in Deleuze’s philosophy is his rejection of the metaphysical. Perhaps this is my own mis-reading of his ideas, but it seems that he limits the realm of creative thinking to the categories of art, philosophy, and science. It seems strange that he would flat-out reject other modes of intentional exploration of the mind, self, and universe. This seems especially peculiar since Deleuze’s ideas of (to name just a few) becoming, the rhizome, and striated space, strike me as rather metaphysical ideas. Perhaps his rejection of these more abstract or experimental ideas is a strategy for keeping within his own notion of the “real.”

The point that I am making, or perhaps it is more of a question is: I agree that to create it to express autonomy, and that to create is also to express thought. These expressions when read by others then may have the ability to trigger a similar affect in those individuals in a way that normal perception can be undermined as it is caught off guard by a true thought as opposed to something it can have a reflex to. However, since we live in a fast paced hyper-real saturated world, it seems that even affect may not be enough to produce any long-lasting residue. Perhaps real change then cannot come simply from the experience of true creation, maybe it comes from someplace beyond that? Where exactly, I’m not sure, but limiting ourselves to strict categories for exploration seem to be just that, limiting.

– Stephanie


Posted in Deleuze, Philosophy and Science with tags on March 30, 2011 by immanentterrain2

Sorry for the corny clip… but who doesn’t love some James Franco, right?

I posted it, because I feel that from it we can reflect upon the power that the poetic use of language and meaning (in any art form) can have to convey precepts and affects in a truly immanent way; but also because it can serve as good starting point for me to tackle one of the premises in Deleuze’s philosophy which has been hardest for me to fully digest, specifically, Deleuze’s statement of writing for “future un-born readers”.

We were first introduced to this idea while speaking about the rupture of these non-state philosophers with the traditional conception of language and meaning within their discipline, specifically the conception of a true attainable essence typical of rationalist philosophy. I was originally confused by this statement of Deleuze, because I had originally associated similar “post-structural” reinterpretations of language (I use quotation marks, because I know how much Sam hates the loose use of terms with a “post” prefix) with the idea that the acceptance of ambiguity and poetic elements in communication could lead to a more direct relation with the intimacy and subjectivity (a complex and “constantly-becoming” subjectivity of course) of our fellow men; that by reinterpreting the use of language we could go past the categories of false fluidity that have constantly obstructed (with a false aspiration for clarity) our spontaneous relationship with the existence in and around us. On the other hand, this “talking to un-born readers” reminded me of the similar statement made by Adorno at the end of the Cultural Industry book, which I always found to be a very elitist academic positioning, spawned from a very traditionally Marxist dichotomic view of true and false notions, that doesn’t really reflect the basic essence of a true process ontology approach. He even seems to state it clearly in this passage:

“I think there’s a public for philosophy and ways of reaching it, but it’s a clandestine sort of thinking, a sort of nomadic thinking. The only form of communications one can envisage as perfectly adapted to the modern’s world is Adorno’s model of a message in a bottle, or the Nietzschean model of an arrow shot by one thinker and picked up by another”
-On philosophy

We must think of what it means to write in the ideological framework of process ontology. Is the notion of man as “constant becoming” a statement that places us in a particular place in space and time? I know that when we were talking about Hume and pragmatism, we said that in these philosophies there was a direct “resistance to the present”, or resistance to false fluidity of the present, but does that make us look into the future? Or does it just make us re-think of our approach to the present?
When Delueze talks about “reaching future-readers” is he being literal or is he referring to the idea of a subject that is not fixed in any time, a state of being that is immanent with all times of reality, a being that exist in a more truer truth.

Does immanence exclude imminence?

“you don’t write with you ego, your memory, and your illnesses. In the act of writing, there’s an attempt to make life something more than personal, to free life from what imprisons it”
-On Philosophy

This is just an initial reflection, from which I want to come back to, but I do think that the idea of prophecy, expressed in James Franco’s sexy voice (speaking as Allen Ginsberg – i forgot to mention), can really help us to understand that the space/time dilemma in Deleuze’s writing cannot be resolved by mapping it within a traditional teleological conception of time. I think that in some sense Deleuze is trying to fulfill the initial aspirations of scientific thought, by completely going against it’s path. He is trying to attain that communication which is timeless, which can arrive at prophecy, which can arrive at Truth, which can be in contact with a true essence, even if this seems like a direct contradiction to everything else that he has been saying. I believe he wants to talk to the reader of today and tomorrow. He wants to create a vessel of meaning that, like a hypothetical Lynn structure, can adapt itself to the movement inherent to the spiral of time drawn out by Nietzsche. The only possible architecture for this type of vessel depends on poetry, not as literary form, but as a reinterpretation of the fixed meanings and of the dynamic possibilities of human communication.

-Alexander Chaparro